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MANUFACTURED DIVERSITY

sentative is different from the citizenship of the infant, incompetent, or
decedent, the citizenship of the one being represented automatically controls. Also, the rewording of the assignment clause to deprive the district
court of jurisdiction over the parties whenever an object of the transaction is to invoke or to defeat federal jurisdiction is more stringent than
the present statute. 52
Thus, in view of the increasing criticism and study of the concept of
manufactured diversity jurisdiction, the result of McSparren. v. Weist
was not unexpected. Although McSparren is a move in the right direction, the decision leaves several questions unanswered. The court held
where the sole purpose of the appointment of a foreign representative is
to create diversity the action is "improper" and therefore "offends against
§ 1359.""S This leaves open to litigation the question whether the appointment has as its (1) sole purpose (2) its principal purpose or (3) one
of its purposes the manufacture of diversity.54 Although barred by prior
Supreme Court decisions, 55 it seems that the better test would be to look
to the citizenship of the deceased, minor, or incompetent for purposes of
MICKEY A. HERRIN
deciding jurisdiction.

Federal Taxation-Unreasonable Corporate Accumulation and the
"Any Purpose" Test
"It can be contended that every corporation, when organized, has as
one of its purposes, the avoidance of surtax."1 Though this may be true
"2Id. at 102. "Ordinarily, the absolute transfer of property for valuable consideration would negative any conclusion that an object of the transfer was to
create diversity." Id. The proposed statute would certainly change the result in

City of Eufaula.

"' 402 F.2d at 876. Apparently the holding would not include the situation
where the original administrator resigns, because in this instance someone must
be appointed before the suit can be brought.
" Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Curlee Clothing Co., 19 F.2d 439 (8th
Cir. 1927). A corporation's reincorporation in another state, though defective, was
interpreted to be permanent. Acquiring federal jurisdiction was only one consideration, and probably a minor one, for the change. Federal jurisdiction was
upheld. Id. at 440. If attorneys begin to choose as foreign representatives out-ofstate relatives with a legitimate interest in the litigation, then the question would
be squarely presented to the court.
" Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903) ; Rice v. Houston, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 66 (1871); Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 306

(1808).
' Halperin, The Surtax on CorporationsImproperly Accumulating Surptu, 18
72, 76 (1940).
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in a theoretical sense, Congress has not sought to penalize such a purpose
when it is merely a normal incident of the use of the corporate form.
When, however, the corporation is "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders . . .by

permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided
or distributed,"' Congress has imposed virtually a confiscatory surtax on
these accumulated earnings.' The purpose of the tax is to compel the
company to distribute any profits not needed for the conduct of its business
so that shareholders may be taxed on the dividends received.4
Before the tax is imposed, it must first be shown that the accumulation is unreasonable;5 this is a relatively objective test and most of the
cases under the statute have been concerned with its determination.' A
basic issue, however, remains whether or not the tax avoidance purpose
is present in the decision to accumulate. 7 This proof-that the corporation was "formed or availed of for the purpose of tax avoidance"---is
necessarily subjective in nature. Congress, therefore, has provided that
2INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 532(a). The basic provisions of the accumulated
earnings tax, now found in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-37, have been in existence since 1921 and remain substantially unchanged. See Revenue Act of 1921,
§ 220, 42 Stat. 247.
'Section 531 imposes a tax of 27Y2 percent of the accumulated taxable income
not in excess of 100,000 dollars, plus 383/2 percent of the accumulated taxable in-come in excess of 100,000 dollars. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 531.
"Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943).
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 533(a). It is interesting to note that in this regard

Congress has provided one of those rare instances in which the taxpayer can

shift the burden of proof to the government. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 534. The
value of this shift, however, is not so great as it might first appear. As it has
been pointed out, "[tihe reasonable needs of the business is really a subsidiary question . . .The burden of proof as to the ultimate question, whether the taxpayer
corporation has been availed of for the purpose of avoiding tax on its stockholders,
always remains with the taxpayer." Hammond & Victor, The Accumulated Earnings Tax, 9 PRAc. LAW. No. 8, 1963, at 92.
"E.g., Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958). Discussion of what factors are relevant in determining
the reasonableness of the accumulation is beyond the scope of this note. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.533-1 (a) (2) (1959); Carey, Accumulations Beyond the
Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Dilemma of Section 102(c), 60 HARV. L.
REv. 1282 (1947); Hernitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings
Tax, 74 HARv. L. REV. 866 (1961); Note, Accumulated Earnings and the Reasonableness Test of Section 537, 43 TJL. L. REv. 129 (1968).
'See Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205, 214 (6th Cir. 1968),
vacated and remanded, 89 S.Ct. 707 (1969) (per curiam).
' INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532(a).
'See Casey v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1959) (concurring
opinion). One writer has pointed out that
proof of state of mind is always fraught with difficulty. Direct evidence is
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the fact that the corporation's profits and earnings are allowed to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of
the proscribed purpose unless the contrary is proven by the preponderance
of the evidence.'0
If there is an unreasonable accumulation of income, what must the
taxpayer do to show by a "preponderance of the evidence" that the tax
avoidance motive was absent? Prior to the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Donruss Company," the courts were divided
over the issue. Three distinct tests were applied in deciding when there
was sufficient tax avoidance purpose to impose the surtax: (1) tax avoid2
ance must be the "dominant, controlling, or impelling" motive,' (2) it
must be one of the "determinating purposes" in the decision to accumu4
late, 3 and (3) it is sufficient if "any purpose" is tax avoidance.' In resolving this conflict, the Supreme Court adopted the "any purpose" test, i.e., the
government's contention that "it is sufficient if [tax avoidance] is one of
5
the purposes for the company's accumulation policy."'
The Donruss Company had increased its accumulated earnings over a
six year period from 1.02 to 1.67 million dollars. During this period the
sole shareholder had received no income from the business other than his
normal salary. In a suit for refund of the penalty tax, the jury found
that although the accumulation was beyond the reasonable needs of the
business, there had been no tax avoidance purpose present.'" The court
of appeals reversed the judgment entered on the verdict because the charge
usually unavailable, and reliance must be placed on inferences from the surrounding circumstances. In addition, the taxpayer here is always a corporation, and resort must therefore be had to the motives of the individuals in
control of the corporation since, of course, it can have no independent state
of mind.
Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumndated Earnings Tax, 74 HARV. L. REV.
866, 869 (1961).
I0NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533(a).
1189 S. Ct. 501 (1969).
12 Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1967); accord,
Young Mtr. Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
" Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958); accord,
World Publ. Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 911 (1949).
" R.L. Blaffer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 851 (1937), affd, 103 F.2d
487 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 576 (1939); accord, Barrow Mfg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962);
Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d,-278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 958 (1958).
10 89 S. Ct. at 502.
Id.
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to the jury implied that the proscribed motive had to be the sole determining factor in the decision to accumulate.' 7 On remand the court instructed that the correct test was that tax avoidance must be the "dominant, controlling, or impelling" motive.""
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the major argument of the parties
dealt with the construction of the words "formed or availed of for the
purpose of tax avoidance" in section 532(a). Taxpayer argued that the
use of the word "the' instead of "a" supported the "dominant purpose"
test applied by the court of appeals.'" The government asserted that
the phrase, when read as a whole, supported its proposed "any purpose"
test.2" Discounting both arguments as inconclusive and referring to the
statutory language as "inherently vague,"'" the Court concentrated on
the factor of congressional intent to find support for the government's
position. In examining the history of the accumulated earnings tax, the
Court noted that Congress had consistently maintained a firm position
against this type of tax avoidance.2 2 The Court interpreted the 1954
additions' to the accumulated earnings tax provisions as congressional
recognition of "the tremendous difficulty of ascertaining the purpose for
corporate accumulations" 2 4 and concluded that the "congressional response
to these facts has been to emphasize unreasonable accumulation as the most
significant factor in the incidence of the tax."25 Since Congress intended
to emphasize the relatively objective inquiry into the reasonableness of the
accumulation, reasoned the Court, it would be inconsistent with this intent
to allow a taxpayer, once the objective criterion is satisfied, to escape the
tax when the proscribed purpose was present to any degree.2 0 Thus, the
Court concluded that Congress intended to impose the surtax if any tax
avoidance motive is present when there is an accuriulation beyond the
reasonable needs of the business.
Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1967).
Id.
89 S. Ct. at 504. See Young Mtr. Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st
Cir. 1960).
2089 S. Ct. at 504.
2
21 Id.
2 Id. at 505-07.
2 Section 535 (c) allows a minimum credit of 100,000 dollars to the corporation.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 535(c). Section 537 provides that the term "reasonable
needs of the business" shall include the "reasonably anticipated needs of the busi'"

'-

ness."

INT. REV. CODE

21 89 S. Ct. at 507.
2r Id.

20 Id.

of 1954, § 537.
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Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
that the congressional intent was to rely more heavily on the objective
test 7 He concluded, however, that the words of section 533 (a) reveal
an intention to give the taxpayer a "last clear chance" to prove the absence
of the avoidance motive. Mr. Justice Harlan took issue with the majority's instruction on remand, which he felt would "effectively deny to
the taxpayer the 'last clear chance' which Congress clearly meant to afford
and substitute a very fuzzy chance indeed." 2 While arguing that the "any
purpose" test of the majority might in reality make the jury believe it
must impose the tax whenever it finds the accumulation unreasonable,2 9
Harlan agreed that the "dominant, controlling, or impelling" motive test
is also inappropriate since it would apparently require proof that tax
avoidance was the strongest of all purposes." Instead, he reasoned, the
jury should be instructed "to impose the tax if it finds that the taxpayer
would not have accumulated earnings but for its knowledge that a tax
saving would result."3 1 It is arguable that this proposed "but for" test
is the same as the "dominant purpose" standard since if taxpayer would
not have accumulated earnings but for the tax factor, then the tax factor
must have been the "dominant purpose." In light of his specific rejection
of the "dominant purpose" test, however, it would seem that Justice Harlan
intends his "but for" test to be analogous to the "determinating purpose"
test. Under this standard the jury must find that tax avoidance was one
of the principle reasons for the accumulation, though it need not be the
"dominant, controlling, or impelling" motive.3 2
It is questionable whether the test of the majority carries out the true
intentions of Congress. While there is little doubt that the 1954 additions3 to the tax provisions place more emphasis on the reasonableness
of corporate accumulation, it is important to note that both new provisions are designed to alleviate the burden on the taxpayer. 4 Indeed, as
the Court itself concluded, the amendments were a congressional recognition of "the tremendous difficulty of ascertaining the purpose for corporate
accumulations."' 8 It would appear to be inconsistent with this con2 Id. at 508-10.
28 Id. at 508.
2"Id. at 509.
80 Id. at 510.
"Id.
82 See note 13 supra.
"See note 23 supra.
"See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
"89 S. Ct. at 507.
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gressional attitude to require imposition of the tax where the jury, judging
in retrospect, 38 finds the business reasons for accumulation without merit
but further finds only some slight avoidance motive.8 7 The argument for
a less strict congressional intent gains further support from the fact that
the 1954 recodification of section 533(a) deleted the adjective "clear"
from the phrase "clear preponderance of the evidence"-the burden that
the taxpayer must meet to show insufficient tax avoidance motive. While
it may have been a mere change in phraseology, logically the deletion indicates an intent to reduce the taxpayer's burden of proof.
In answer to the Harlan criticism that the "any purpose" test effectively denies the taxpayer a "last clear chance" to escape the tax,8 the
majority pointed out that the taxpayer may "show that even though
knowledge of the tax consequences was present, that knowledge did not
contribute to the decision to accumulate earnings."8 9 This chance, however, is quite slim. As one writer has argued: "Since the issue of whether
to pay a dividend involves a balancing of the needs of the corporation
and the desires of the stockholders for a cash return on their investment,
the potential taxes on such dividends would necessarily play some part
in a decision to have the corporation accumulate its earnings ....
Thus, corporate knowledge of the tax consequences normally does influence the decision to accumulate, and, of course, there is always a chance
that the accumulation might be found to be unreasonable. It has been
suggested that "the only corporations that could safely accumulate income
would be those having stockholders with substantial net losses,"41 thus
having little interest in dividend tax consequences. It is doubtful that
Congress intended such a result.
Perhaps the sounder view is the "determinating purposes" test
promulgated in Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner42 and ostensibly
"Although the rule is that the reasonableness is to be judged as of the time
of the accumulation, normally several years have elapsed between the decision to
accumulate and the trial, and subsequent events realistically do influence the jury's
determination. See Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1957).
"'See Note, Federal Income Taxation--Accumulated Earnings Tax-Tax
Avoidance Must Be the Dominant Purpose For the Accumulation of Earnings and
Profits By a CorporationBefore the Accumulated Earnings Tax May Be Imposed,
43 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 566 (1968).
3889 S.Ct. at 508.
I°
d.
Herwitz, spra note 9, at 875.
"Young Mtr. Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 1960).
" 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).
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adopted in Mr. Justice Harlan's "but for" test. As noted above this
test would require a jury finding that tax avoidance was a major consideration in the decision to accumulate before imposing the surtax. This
would require more than the mere existence of an avoidance factor but
less than a conclusion that the proscribed purpose was the "dominant, controlling, or compelling" motive. Arguably this would be consistent with
the burden of proof as set forth in section 533(a) since the test, while
placing emphasis on the unreasonable accumulation, would give the taxpayer a realistic "last clear chance" to escape the tax. Clearly Congress intended such a result since the statute provides that even though the objective
criterion of unreasonableness be satisfied, the taxpayer can avoid imposition of the surtax by proving by a "preponderance" of the evidence the
absence of the proscribed purpose.
It is interesting to speculate as to the actual impact of the "any purpose" test. Keeping in mind the fact that any test of taxpayer motive
is subjective in nature, it would seem reasonable to expect an average
jury to engage in a "balancing of the equities." For example, if the jury,
after making the basically objective determination that the accumulation
was unreasonable, found that on a scale of ten motivation factors only
one of the factors was tax avoidance, it might well render its verdict that
no tax avoidance purpose was present. Indeed one might argue that the
average jury is invited to engage in a balancing practice under the "any
purpose" instruction, thus finding no tax avoidance purpose where it
might otherwise have found a slight avoidance purpose present. Since the
existence of the tax avoidance purpose is a factual determination,
appellate courts might be hard pressed to find grounds for overturning
such verdicts.
While in reality the average jury might engage in a balancing practice,
corporate planners must anticipate a literal interpretation of the "any
purpose" instruction. The effect,4" then, of the Donruss decision may be
far-reaching, especially in areas such as corporate diversification.4 4 Since
the Court's instruction is based upon a questionable interpretation of
" The effect of the decision will fall primarily on closely held corporations. As
one writer pointed out, "although there is nothing in the Code of Regulations so
stating, publicly held corporations can be said not to fall within the scope of the
accumulated earnings tax." Note, The Accumulated Earnings Tax as a Deterrent
to Business Diversification of Close Corporations, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 98, 103
(1967).
" For discussion of the problems presented corporations by the accumulated
earnings tax see Id.; Note, The Accumulated Earnings Tax and the Problem of
Diversification, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1135 (1966).
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congressional intent, it is submitted that Congress should act to restate
the amount of avoidance motive it feels should be present before imposition of the surtax.
JAMES

R.

CARPENTER

Income Tax-Deductibility of Losses Suffered in Intra-Family
Transfers
In Merritt v. Commissioner,' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that section 267 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 precluded
deduction of a loss suffered by a husband when his stock in a family
corporation was sold to his wife in an involuntary sale. The sale had been
forced by the Internal Revenue Service to obtain funds for the payment
of taxes from previous years, and the wife's 25,000 dollar bid was in
sharp contrast to the 135,000 dollar basis at which the husband had been
carrying the property. But the court of appeals affirmed the decision of
the Tax Court2 and disallowed the 110,000 dollar deduction.
The broad terms of section 267 disallow any deduction claimed for
losses suffered in transactions between certain related taxpayers, generally family members. 3 The provisions of this present section originated
in section 24(a) (6) (A) and (B) of the Revenue Act of 1934.' Prior to
1934, the rule was that the deductibilty of all sales, regardless of the
identity of the vendor and vendee, depended on the presence of a bona
1400 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1968).
'James H. Merritt, Sr., 47 T.C. 519 (1967).
' Section 267 provides:
(a) Deductions Disallowed.-No deduction shall be allowed(1) Losses.-In respect of loses from sales or exchanges of property
(other than losses in cases of distributions in corporate liquidations), directly
or indirectly, between persons specified within any one of the paragraphs of
subsection (b).
(b) Relationships.-The persons referred to in subsection (a) are:
(1) Members of a family, as defined in subsection (c) (4)
(c) Constructive Ownership of Stock-For purposes of determining, in
applying subsection (b), the ownership of stock(4) The family of an individual shall include only his brothers and
sisters (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal
descendants.

...

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 267 (emphasis added).
'48 Stat. 680, 691 (1934).

